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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
Washington, D.C. 20507 
Office of 
General Counsel 
August 21, 1990 
Ms. Constance DuPre, Clerk 
United States Court of Appeals 
For the District of Columbia 
United States Courthouse 
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
RE: Ann B. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 90-7099. 
Dear Ms. DuPre: 
Please find enclosed four copies and one original of EEOC's 
Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Strike EEOC's Brief as Amicus 
Curiae. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not 
hesitate to contact me at the address or telephone number noted 
below. 
cc: counsel of record 
Sincerely, 
SUSAN L.P. STARR 
Appellate Attorney 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 
1801 L Street, N.W. 





ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 7, 1990 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
No. 90-7099 





On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of Columbia 
EEOC'S OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE EEOC'S BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE 
1. Appellant Price Waterhouse initially argues that EEOC's 
brief should be stricken because the Commission did not participate 
in this case in earlier proceedings and because it was not aware 
that the Commission was going to participate until August 9, 1990, 
one day after it received Hopkins' brief. Price Waterhouse's 
reasons for striking the Commission's brief are completely without 
legal foundation. Rule 29 F.R.A.P. states that an agency of the 
United States has a right to participate as amicus curiae 
irrespective of the parties' consent or leave of the court. The 
Commission is under no obligation to notify opposing counsel of its 
. . 
intent to file a brief as amicus, although we did so in this case 
out of courtesy to Price Waterhouse. The Commission filed its 
brief only two days after Hopkins' brief was filed1 so as to give 
Price Waterhouse as much time as possible to respond to the 
Commission's argument in its reply brief. 2 
2. Price Waterhouse alleges that the Commission's brief should 
also be stricken because it is rife with inaccurate factual 
assertions. However, the Commission supported every statement 
Price Waterhouse now challenges by a cite to a published decision. 
Price Waterhouse fails to show how the brief misrepresents the 
particular authority cited, with one possible exception3 • Instead, 
they attempt to hide behind a smokescreen of baseless allegations 
Local Rule ll(e) (3) allows amicus briefs to be filed as 
much as fifteen days after "service of the brief of the party whose 
side the intervenor or amicus supports." Because this was an 
expedited appeal, the Commission filed its brief well ahead of that 
schedule. 
2 Price Waterhouse chose not to address the Commission's 
arguments in its August 15, 1990 reply brief, allegedly because 
they were not notified earlier of the Commission's participation. 
However, despite its argument that the lack of additional notice 
"deprived Price Waterhouse of a meaningful opportunity [to 
respond]" (appellant motion at 2), Price Waterhouse apparently had 
sufficient time to challenge many of the issues raised in the 
Commission's brief in its motion to strike, filed the very same 
day as the reply brief. 
3 Price Waterhouse correctly points out that this Court 
stated in its 1987 decision that there was only one comment made 
by a partner who opposed Hopkins' candidacy which was gender 
specific. Motion at 4, n.1. However, it appeared from the 
district court's findings that there were two gender specific 
comments made by opponents of Hopkins. ( "One commentator said 'she 
may have overcompensated for being a woman.' Another suggested that 
she needed to take a 'course in charm school. ' Supporters 
indicated that her critics judged her harshly due to her sex .. 
. "Hopkins, 618 F. supp. 1109, 1115-16). 
2 
of EEOC misconduct. 
Price Waterhouse argues that the Commission's statement that 
"it was clear from the evidence that [Price Waterhouse] would not 
voluntarily admit her to the partnership" (EEOC br. at 9) misstated 
the record. 
accurate. 
However, the Commission could not have been more 
The district court said, "[o]rdering Price Waterhouse 
to simply reconsider Ms. Hopkins for partnership would be futile 
and unjust, because the testimony of Price Waterhouse's chairman 
at the relief trial suggested that the deck is stacked against her. 
Price Waterhouse plainly does not want her and would not 
voluntarily admit her." Slip op. at 19. 
Citing the district court's vacated 1985 decision, Price 
Waterhouse also argues that it was inaccurate for the Commission 
to state that sexual stereotyping permeated their decision to place 
Hopkins' candidacy on hold. Again Price Waterhouse chooses to 
ignore the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the 
district court's 1990 decision. The court held that Price 
Waterhouse failed to meet its burden of specifically identifying 
which partner comments were tainted by sexual stereotyping and 
which were not, thereby leaving the court to conclude that sex 
discrimination motivated the decision to place Hopkins' candidacy 
on hold: 
Price Waterhouse, having permitted discriminatory 
comments to be weighed in the hold decision when 
appraising Ms. Hopkins, was required to separate the good 
from the bad ... It was apparent from the testimony 
that disentangling stereotyping from fact is difficult 
. Moreover, the Court has been provided with no 
guidance to enable it to differentiate between all 
sexually stereotyped comments and comments not influenced 
3 
by stereotyping .•. Ms. Hopkins must be deemed to have 
failed to receive partnership at the time she was held 
over because of sex discrimination, in violation of Title 
VII. 
Slip op. at 8-9, 11. In light of these findings, the Commission's 
characterization of Price Waterhouse's 1982 partnership evaluation 
process as being permeated by sexual stereotyping was completely 
accurate. 
Price Waterhouse also alleges that the Commission 
mischaracterized the record by stating that Price Waterhouse failed 
to introduce evidence that its partners were not motivated by 
discriminatory animus. However, that is not what the Commission's 
brief says. The Commission did not offer an opinion as to whether 
Price Waterhouse did or did not introduce evidence on this issue 
in the 1985 trial. Instead, the brief merely states that the 
Commission agrees with the district court's conclusion that, as 
part of its burden of proof, Price Waterhouse was obligated to 
present some evidence of the partner's motivations. EEOC br. at 
14. The Commission went on to embrace the district court's 
conclusion that, because Price Waterhouse failed to present any 
evidence whatsoever on remand, Price Waterhouse failed to meet its 
burden. See slip op. at 10. Price Waterhouse is apparently 
challenging the district court's findings of fact and the 
Commission's reliance thereon. Al though they certainly have a 
right to do so, Price Waterhouse's characterization of EEOC's brief 
as distorting the record is inaccurate. 
4 
WHEREFORE, the EEOC respectfully requests this Court deny 
Price Waterhouse's motion to strike EEOC's brief in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONALD R. LIVINGSTON 
General Counsel(Acting) 
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS 
Associate General Counsel 
VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD 
Assistant General Counsel 
SUSAN L.P. STARR 
Attorney 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION 
1801 L Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20507 
202/663-4726 
FTS/989-4726 
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